Text: S.1678 — 116th Congress (2019-2020)

To express United States support for Taiwan's diplomatic alliances around the world.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019”.

SEC. 2. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8) states that it is the policy of the United States “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan”.

(2) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states that it is the policy of the United States “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan”.

(3) Taiwan is a free, democratic, and prosperous nation of 23,000,000 people and an important contributor to peace and stability around the world.

(4) Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in 2016, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has intensified its efforts to pressure Taiwan.

(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

(6) Taiwan currently maintains full diplomatic relations with 15 nations around the world.

(7) Taiwan’s unofficial relations with the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and other countries are of significant benefit in strengthening Taiwan’s economy and preserving its international space.

(8) According to President Tsai Ing-wen, the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China is “part of a series of diplomatic and military acts of coercion” by China.

(9) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) states that—

(A) it is United States policy “to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States”; and

(B) the President should—

(i) “conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces”; and

(ii) “encourage the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act”.

SEC. 3. STRENGTHENING OF OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL TIES WITH TAIWAN.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should—

(1) support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as unofficial partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world;

(2) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan; and

(3) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, reducing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine Taiwan.

(b) CONSULTATION.—Not less than 30 days before increasing or decreasing the United States Government's economic, security, or diplomatic engagement with another nation as a result of an action taken by that nation to either strengthen or undermine ties with Taiwan, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the proposed United States action or actions.

(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede or otherwise alter obligations to comply with the notification procedures applicable to reprogramming pursuant to section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1).

SEC. 4. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

It should be the policy of the United States—

(1) to advocate, as appropriate—

(A) for Taiwan’s membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement and in which the United States is also a participant; and

(B) for Taiwan to be granted observer status in other appropriate international organizations;

(2) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the United States Government in all organizations described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to advocate for Taiwan’s membership or observer status in such organizations; and

(3) for the President or the President's designees to advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan’s membership or observer status in all organizations described in paragraph (1) as part of any relevant bilateral engagements between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, including leader summits and the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should engage in bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan, with the goal of entering into a free trade agreement that is of mutual economic benefit and that protects United States workers and benefits United States exporters.

SEC. 6. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Passed the Senate October 29, 2019.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) announced that Taiwan will actively push UN participation campaign on August 23, 2019.  The Deputy Foreign Minister Kelly Wu-chaio Hsieh detailed the international campaign aimed at giving the 23 million people of Taiwan a voice in the activities, meetings and mechanisms of the United Nation.  This is the multichannel international campaign.   According to the MOFA, several Taiwan’s diplomatic allies will present a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calling on him to address Taiwan’s exclusion from the world body on the basis of fairness, justice and inclusiveness, as well as its pledge to serve all peoples around the world.  The 74^th session of the UN General Assembly begins September 17, while the UN General Debate running from Sept. 24 to Sept. 30.  In 1971, Taiwan was expelled from UN.  The seat was given to the People’s Republic of China (PROC).  Taiwan’s government has been pushing to join the UN every year since 1993.  Taiwan’s attempt was unsuccessful due to strong opposition from PROC.   This year’s strategy will be different from the past.  In addition to writing letter to the Secretary-General, Taiwan’s allies will speak up for it at the assembly; holding a series of forums on vital issues, such as sustainable development, universal healthcare and youth empowerment in New York; and a march emphasizing the important of Taiwan’s UN participation.   Last year Taiwan’s foreign minister Joseph Wu said “Taiwan deserves to have a role in the United Nations, just as any other countries in the world” in an interview.  Every year, China used its clout to block Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations as well as affiliated organizations.  Over the last two years, China has stepped up the pressure to Taiwan.     Taiwan really needs the help from more peace-loving countries to fight back China’s blocking.

On July 10, the Wilson Center invited Cheng Wen-tsan, mayor of Taoyuan City, Taiwan, to give a talk about Taiwan’s role in Indo-Pacific region.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy unveiled by President Trump has been regarded as a roadmap for U.S. engagement in Asia. It can also be seen as a new vision for the United States as it grapples with the rapidly shifting political, economic, and security realties of the region. For Taiwan, the question is how FOIP configures in defining and strengthening Washington's relations with Taipei. Join us for a discussion of FOIP with the mayor of Taoyuan City, Cheng Wen-tsan, who became the youngest mayor among Taiwan's six special municipalities when he first won his seat in 2014.

The Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Rand Corporation, presented a half-day discussion of China’s relations with Taiwan on July 5, 2019.  The event was co-sponsored with Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), Taiwan.  The Rand’s event program stated “China’s relations with Taiwan have varied depending on the political leadership in the two entities, and their changing concepts of security.   Military preparedness and economic power have recently emerged as additional factors in the relationship.  We will discuss these issues through the ongoing work of scholars of the region”.   Dr. Rafig Dossani, Director of Center for Asia Pacific Policy, Rand, Dr. Cheng-yi Lin, INDSR, and Abraham Chu, TECO-LA delivered opening remarks, followed by an opening speech by Minister Ming-tong Chen, Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan.  The event had three sessions: Session I: The PRC’s Taiwan Policy, Session II: The PRC’s Military Strategy, and Session III Taiwan’s China Policy and Military Strategy.   The followings are the topics and speakers for each session.

Session I: 1. Economic issues, Rafig Dossani

                  2. Geopolitical Strategy, Sale Lilly, Rand

                  3. China’s Unified Front Work toward Taiwan, Tzu-chieh hung, INDSR

                  4. Chinese Views of “One Country, Two System” and Implications for Taiwan,   

                      Derek Grossman, Rand

Session II: 1. China’s Military Modernization, Cortez Cooper, Rand

                   2. Asymmetric Military Relations across the Taiwan Strait, Jyh-shyang Sheu,    

                       INDSR

                   3. A New Level of Warfare or More of the same? What the PLA is doing with

                      Artificial Intelligence, Christian Curriden, Rand

Session III: 1. The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Defense, Kharis Templeman, Stanford

                        University

                    2. Developing the Future: Acting Right Now through Learning from the Past,

                        Wen-jenq Chen, National Security Council, Taiwan

                    3. Scorecard: Taiwan’s Strategic Readiness and Resilience, Jyun-yi Lee, INDSR

The Heritage Foundation and the Prospect Foundation, Taiwan, co-hosted a conference “Cross-strait relations: Present challenges and future developments” on July 2, 2019.   The agenda are shown below.

Agenda

Keynote Remarks (9:30 a.m.)

Chen Ming-tong, Mainland Affairs Council Minister, Republic of China (Taiwan) Introduced by: Bridgett Wagner, Vice President, Policy Promotion, The Heritage Foundation

Host: Walter Lohman, Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation

Panel 1: Taiwan-US-China Relations and the Situation of the Taiwan Strait (10:30-11:45 a.m.)

I-Chung Lai, President, The Prospect Foundation
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Richard Bush, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation – Moderator

Remarks by The Honorable Jonathan Moore
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of International Organization Affairs US Department of State
(11:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.)

Luncheon in Allison Foyer (12:15-1:15 p.m.)
 

Panel 2: China Sharp Power against Taiwan and U.S. (1:30-2:45 p.m.)

Wen-Cheng Lin, President, Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies
Puma Shen, Assistant Professor, Graduate of Criminology, National Taipei University
Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049
Dan Aum, Director of the Washington, D.C. Office, The National Bureau of Asian Research - Moderator

Panel 3: Chinese Domestic Politics and Its Impacts on Taiwan-U.S.-China Relations (2:45 p.m.-4:00 p.m.)

Ho-Fung Hung, Prof. in Political Economy, Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University
Yun Sun, Director of the China Program, Stimson Center
Cheng-Yi Lin, CEO, Institute for National Defense and Security Research
I-Chung Lai, President, The Prospect Foundation – Moderator

Panel 4: Cross-Strait Economic Relations and the US-China Trade War (4:15-5:30 p.m.)

Ming-Fang Tsai, Professor, Department of Industrial Economics, Tamkang University
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, US Taiwan Business Council
Riley Walters, Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation
Walter Lohman, The Heritage Foundation – Moderator

Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu will represent the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the 2020 presidential election.   On July 15, KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih announced that Han defeated other four candidates in the polls conducted in the last seven days.    Han received a 44.805% support, while his closest challenger, former Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Chairman Terry Kuo receiving 27.73% support. The polls were conducted by five different pollsters in a very complicated manner.  First, the polls compared the popularity of five candidates.  Its weight was only 15%.  Next each candidate ran against President Tsai Ing-wen, representing DPP; and independent Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, a potential candidate from third group.  This accounted for 85% of weight.     According to the news released by KMT, five polling companies gather a total of 15,185 valid samples via landlines (home).   The telephone survey did not include cell phone.    Among the other contenders, former New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu received 17.90% support, Chou His-wei 6.02%, and Chang Ya-chung 3.54%.   Chu was KMT’s presidential candidate in 2016 and was defeated by President Tsai by wide margin.   Chu prepared for 2020 comeback for long time.  Unfortunately, this time KMT supporters prefer Han.   Terry Kuo jumped into the race only three months ago.   If he entered the race earlier, he might win the race.    Han was elected to the office of Kaohsiung only six months ago.  His decision to seek higher office irritated residents of Kaoshiung.  As a result, two citizen groups would intensify efforts to recall Han.  Citizens Mowing Action and We Care Kaohsiung are leading a campaign to collect signatures to force a recall vote on the mayor.  They critisized Han as a “runwaay mayor” who is uninterested in governing the city and who broke his promise and lied to his supporters.  The disappointment and anger toward Han were reflected in the number of signatures that the campaign organizers have collected for a recall petition.      To this date, they collected over 130,000 signatures.  Regarding Han’s political career, in the worst case, Han might get beaten by President Tsai in the presidential election next January and be removed from his office by a successful recall later.

President Tsai Ing-wen will represent the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2020 presidential election.   On June 13, DPP Chairman Cho Jung-tai announced that Tsai defeated former Premier Lai Ching-te in the polls conducted in the last three days.    The polls were conducted by five different pollsters in a three-way manner.  The poll compared the popularity of Tsai and Lai against Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (most likely a KMT candidate) and independent Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je.  Tsai beat Lai by 8.2 percentage point.  Comparing Tsai-Han-Ko, Tsai received an average support rate of 35.67%, while Han and Ko received support rates of 22.7% and 24.51%, respective4ly.  In the case of Lai-Han-Ko, the support rates are Lai 27.48%, Han 23.47% and Ko 27.38%.  The polls collected a combined total of 16,051 valid samples through cellphone and house phone interviews, accounting for 7,995 and 8,056 samples, respectively.  Each pollster was required to collect a minimum of 3000 sample (1500 minimum for both cellphone and house phone interviews).  This is the first time that a huge sample was collected through interview of cellphone and house phone in Taiwan.  The DPP's presidential primary generated lots of attention because President Tsai was challenged by her trusted right-hand man, former Premier Lai.   After announcement, Lai and Tsai chatted briefly.  Later President Tsai held a news conference that she would meet Lai in the coming days to discuss the party’s election strategy.   Tsai said “By having an open competition, we can have progress.  I want to thank Lai for his criticism, so that I can reflect on where my blind spots and problems are”.

At the opening session of the World Health Assembly (WHA) on May 20, St.Vincent and the Grenadines Minister of Health Luke Browne delivered a powerful speech outing the common sense reasons why Taiwan should logically be included in the World Health Organization’s (WHO) annual forum.  The 71th WHA was held in Geneva, Switzerland.   

The following is the complete transcript of Browne's speech:

"Mr. President, we are once again debating a proposed supplementary agenda item entitled 'Inviting Taiwan to Participate in the World Health Assembly as an Observer.' I look forward to the day when the objective being pursued is achieved, the just aspirations of the Taiwanese people realized, and purely health considerations take precedence at this supposedly 'World Health Assembly.'

There's simply no principled basis why Taiwan should not be here. The argument in favor of allowing Taiwan to participate in this assembly as an observer are straightforward and clearcut.

We all know that the PRC government does not exercise authority and control over Taiwan and cannot be reasonably said to represent it here. Taiwan was never defined to be a part of the PRC, nor can it properly considered so to be, since the two places have separate, autonomous, independent, and very different governments.

The participation of Taiwan at this assembly as an observer is neither illegal, as suggested by the delegate from the People's Republic of China, nor inconsistent with any resolution. As we could see from the fact that Taiwan used to be here as an observer in previous times.

The only reason why it is not here now is because of the fact that the government in Beijing does not like the current administration in Taipei. Is this right?

Should the legitimate health interests of the 23 million people in Taiwan be held ransom to the preferences of a government? Interestingly, the fact that Taiwan was previously allowed to be here as an observer is an open acknowledgment by the PRC itself that it could not adequately represent the interests of Taiwan at this forum.

If Taiwan were really and truly a part of the PRC, should it ever have been allowed to come to this assembly as an observer? Can a part of my country, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, be invited to sit here as an observer?

St. Vincent and the Grenadines is of the view that the proposed invitation of Taiwan to participate in the World Health Assembly, at least as an observer, is not even incompatible with the oft-cited 'one China' principle. Just like the participation of several nations from the Caribbean in this forum is consistent with our cherished and valued notion of one Caribbean.

One China, just like one Caribbean, can and should only be construed as a reference to a common history, culture, and heritage. Mr. President, I ask that I incline thine ear onto wisdom and reason, apply thine heart onto understanding, and allow the supplementary item entitled 'Inviting Taiwan to Participate in the World Health Assembly as an Observer' to be placed on the agenda in the interest of the health and welfare of the 23 million people of the world located in Taiwan and universal health coverage.

Thank you."

In response, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen took Twitter to thank Browne for his “Stanch support of Taiwan”. 

The Pentagon released its annual report to Congress “Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China” on May 2, 2019.  This 136-page report has 5 chapters, 1 executive summary, and 4 appendixes.    The topics for each chapter are: Chapter 1: Understanding China’s strategy; Chapter 2: Force modernization goals and trends; Chapter 3: Capabilities for operations along China’s periphery; Chapter 4: Resources for force modernization; and U.S.-China military-to-military contacts.    Regarding the security of Taiwan, the report states “China’s overall strategy toward Taiwan continues to incorporate elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence.  Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign”.    The report used 9 pages to further describe the security in Taiwan Strait with three main subjects: 1. China’s strategy and capabilities development in the Taiwan Strait; 2. China’s courses of action against Taiwan; 3. The PLA’s current posture for a Taiwan conflict; and 4. Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.   This report also cited 7 circumstances under which China would use military force against Taiwan: 1. Formal declaration of Taiwan independence; 2. Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence; 3. Internal unrest in Taiwan; 4. Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; 5. Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue unification; 6. Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and 7. Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.   China’s military actions against Taiwan could include the following options: 1. Air and maritime blockade; 2. Limited force or coercive options; 3. Air and missile campaign; and invasion of Taiwan.   Finally, the report mentions two key takeaways on Taiwan’ defense capabilities; 1. Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue; and 2. To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.